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There are three clear strengths in Vail Palmer’s paper
which any contextual ethic must work hard to match: the
- element of absolute obligation and obedience; the transcend
ence of the norm or command, “the ought” which is independ
ent of anything that “is”; and the effort at a universal ethic
free from relativism. Yet Vail Palmer himself admits that he( achieves this by a Kantian ethic ruled only by the form of acts.Moreover, today we are watchful about uniform norms as
human rationalizing, like Plato’s and Aristotle’s efforts to jus
tify slavery. Also we suspect absolute ethics for their element
of self-righteousness or at least our psychological hunger for
assurance we are right.
In any case, it seems to me that Vail Palmer breaks away
from his own formal ethic when he bases his norms on God’s
actions in history: all the more in that the form he adopts is
hesed, God’s own loyalty and response, with its concreteness,
warmth, and depth of love behind it, and that he defines hesed
in terms of dependability and responsibility. At this point
I he falls back, to derive concrete norms, on the Decalogue as an
inherent part of the covenant. I’d suggest that Paul Lehmann
handles all this better, in making God’s acts and even the coy
I enant part of the context for our action, not the norm for it.
Vail Palmer himself notes that Emil Brunner uses “Die Ord
nungen” in this situational way, even when trying to absolutize
“Das Gebot.” Even the Decalogue it seems to me better to use
as Reinhold Niebuhr does, as providing the norms of justtce
by which love is guided, not commanded, rather than setting
Decalogue over against love as Vail Palmer does, as the neg
1. The German title of Brunner’s Das Gebot und die Ordnungen (1932)
keeps the distinction lost in the English Divine Imperative (1937).
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ative and positive sides of ethics, the forbidden distinguished
from the arena of the spontaneous.
in short, I am suggesting that the author’s “mixed ethic”
is genuinely mixed, with no clear basis for knowing when the
positive and when the negative principles apply (the judge
would have to be beyond both). I personally would rather
that Vail Palmer had gone the full way with the Pharisees, and
produced an ethic outwardly purely legalistic. For the great
rabbis, the motive of obedience is love and gratitude for all
God has done, in the [till richness of Qumran hymns and rab
binic prayers, while the form of obedience is law spelled out
in the fullest convenient detail. They made the law much
more than “thou shalt not,” and thereby broke free from the
tiefensiveness often charged against legalists, where within the
circle of the “defendu” is a safe play-pen for innocence. The
rabbis trusted God to guide them in any situation anywhere
in the world, and put a fence only arotind the Torah, the holy.
in trying, then, to defend a contextual ethic, I must
watch my step. To begin with, I should uncover my own feet
as standing on an ethic of response on the lines of Richard
Niebtihr’s. There are two issues i’d like to work out here: the
first is response to demand, ranging all the way from the trans
cendent Kantian “thou shalt” and the “demand to be worthy”
of the beloved which sets the form for loving, down to the
demands set by social expectation and by psychologically
compulsive drives. Secondly, we respond to gift and grace, and
must make room for an ethic of appreciation. Beyond this, an
ethic of response seems to me primarily concerned with needs,
one’s own and more often other people’s arranged in a con
stantly changing hierarchy according to their immediacy, cru
cial character for life, and one’s own inability to meet them.
It tends to make response to other men and their situations
not a duty or a goal but a basic process of human life.
It seems to me that Quakerism raises three special ques
tions for ethics, whether seen from Vail Palmer’s formalist
standpoint or my contextual one. The first is that “saving
history” is now taking place. Vail Palmer sees that the mighty
acts of God did not end at the Red Sea and Sinai, nor even at
the crucifixion and resurrection; they go on in our time. He is
right to see this, otherwise he would be giving us a good
biblical ethic but a lousy Quaker ethic: indeed just insofar as
God’s past action governs our present one, I do feel that Vail
Palmer, like Lrwis Benson, may be giving us an Anabaptist
,
ethic under cover of Quakerism. But the question is: what is
God now doing? An ethic focused on present salvation is
inherently ambiguous: it can be an ethic based on experience,
on what God has done for vie, and thus a self-realization ethic,
or at least an ethic keyed to whatever has most vividly shown
itself true for me now. Starting from a response-ethic, my own
heresy here might be to use relatedness or involvement as the
ethical value or norm, somewhat in the spirit of a “T-group”
or “encounter group.”
—
An ethic responding to present history, then, must see
what God is doing apart from us, and sometimes, as in the
black community, the visible rebirth does reshape our ethic
and response. But normally we have to bring in a standpoint
of faith here, in what we choose to see as God’s action.
Some would go farther and say that we cannot respond to
what God is now doing without assuming also what God will
do. in any case we are clearly moving into an eschatology, an
ethic of the kingdom. Vail Palmer is right to see Matthew’s
perfectionism in these terms: the absolute demand is set by the
kingdom itself, since we must either “get with it” or be left
behind, in the key passages of Matt. 5 and 6, however, and
the parables of the kingdom in 13, 18:23-35, etc., while Matthew
has introduced a dualism of present act and future reward or
judgment, there seems to be an underlying tradition at least
as old as “Q” (see especially Matt. 12:22-42 and its Luke 11
parallels) in which the kingdom is already fully here, though
hidden, in the power which forgives and brings to repentance.
This power is inherent in what God does, namely his indis—
criminate non-punishment of prodigals and sinners, if men
would only see this as God’s love and respond to it by faith.
“He that has eyes to see, let him see.” Hence for early Friends
L
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God’s consistency was not a logical principle but an awareness
of the consistency of their own inner truth-experience, by
which the Light purified them for the “Lamb’s war” and the
kingdom.
A second Quaker challenge for ethics lies in the centrality
of inner leading by the Spirit for early Friends. This is easily
absolutized by a doctrine of the uniqueness of revelation, and
represents the temptation of the Moral Re-armament and many
pietist groups. It is hard, however, to tie to a formal ethic,
except on a basis going back through Kant to Plato in intui
tionism. The Inner Voice, unless it is itself an act of God, is
hard to tie up to God’s historic acts. From a contextual view,
the problem is easier, since intuition can be seen as a synthesis
of the whole situation, including the whole personalities of the
self and the other people inter-acting at a non-rational level.
Such an approach, nevertheless, tends to an ethic simply
of openness, whese at times one merely lets the conscious self
become aware of “what the situation is,” or “what you yourself
really want.” The transcendent element which early Friends
assumed in the Light’s leadings, and the absolute obedience
which they — and Vail Palmer — have demanded, tend to evapo
rate in proportion as one takes intuition as simply a valid
truth-method. Both the strengths and the weaknesses of “open
ness” are evident in liberal Quakerism.
The third Quaker challenge to ethics is how within our
own tradition we are to describe the antithesis of Light and
the Self at many points, the conflict of Light and Sin. There
are obvious barriers within the self against true response or
obedience. To overcome these, Paul, Luther and Gandhi use
rules as methods of self-discipline and self-purification, mainly
to keep their awareness of truth clean, and their ability to
respond alert. At first sight this suggests the ascetic ethic of
mysticism, but these men wanted to respond to brothers and
their needs, not only to the vision of God.
But there is a real problem in merging such a truth-ethic
with a real guilt-ethic, based on our sin against other men and
God. Another form of this problem is the high worth, given
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in an ethic of truthfulness and response, to total obedience and
total selflessness. We have somehow to combine this valuation
of selflessness with our sense that responsible action consists of
identifying our acts as ours, saying “I did this,” not “I was
led,” or “the situation was kn ethic of response may
not only have to show the relationships of selflessness to self
awareness and self-forgetfulness: it may cease to be an ethic
altogether. Perhaps in Paul’s teaching of living by grace and
faith, without ever being sure whether in deed we have done
right, he comes close to this. It is only in turning back to
what God is like and what God has done (Romans 6) that
Paul sees lie can avoid lawlessness and still live without a law.
• If we take the Spirit seriously, as early Friends did, or
even the doctrine of grace, then I think we must live without
an ethic, even the love-ethic of agape. There has always seemed
an element of miracle in the occasions when, in looking back,
one finds one was really selfless in loving, really met a need or
met a person.
T. CANBY JONES
“I’m a legalist and proud to be one. Naked and unashamed,
I’m a legalist.” These words exploded from my mouth at the
Powell House summer 1971 QTDG conference following Hugh
Barbour’s response to Vail Palmer’s paper on “Deeds and Rules
in Quaker Ethics.” This explosion represented a real ethical
breakthrough for me.
Hearing Vail Palmer’s paper had been a very moving
experience. He had carefully explained the position of the
situation ethics of Joseph Fletcher and the more sophisticated
but similar contextual ethics of Paul Lehmann and also had
brought in the clearly situational ethical viewpoint of the
pamphlet, Towards a Quaker View of Sex. After pointing up
the strengths and weaknesses of these views he went on to
L 23
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demonstrate that the early Quaker ethic was clearly a “mixed
ethic” consisting of both situational and absolute elements.
I resonate with Vail Palmer’s viewpoint because this “bal
anced,” “mixed” or ‘both-and” approach is precisely my under
standing of the nature of the biblical ethic and especially the
ethics of Jesus. In the Bible we find a healthy balance between
following wherever an(l in whatever way the Spirit may lead
(situational ethics) and keeping the commandments, doing the
truth, obeying the covenant (normative ethics). I was also
very happy that Vail Palmer had detected this same biblical
balance in the ethical thought and practice of the early Friends.
This corresponds exactly to my reading of George Fox.
Vail Palmer goes boldly on to claim that for Quakers
today the ethical stance of early Friends is normative. His
paper is an important contribution to the recovery of the
power and ethical vision of the early Quaker movement.
In responding to Vail Palmer’s paper, Hugh Barbour
defined himself as a “contextualist” in ethics. For him, if I
understand him correctly, all ethical decisions are shaped and
informed by personal encounters and personal values in the
context of the given situation, tradition and history. I found
myself fuming, saying to myself, “Contextual ethics, fine; if
you make the context big enough. long enough and wide
enough — big and wide enough to include the whole of man
kind and his environment and long enough to include the
history of mankind, especially the ‘saving history’ focussed on
Sinai, in Jesus’ Cross-resurrection and in the life and power of
the early Friends.”
I’m very grateful for Vail Palmer’s critique of situationists
like Joseph Fletcher who condemn all ethics that have any
norms or ordinances (save that of an amorphous kind of love)
as frozen legalism. I am happy to learn from Fletcher the
dangers of legalism. I covet his call for flexibility, responsive
ness and sensitivity to persons in the emergency situations in
which all ethical decisions are made. But with Vail Palmer I
agree that there are many ethical choices and ethical systems
which lie in between the two extremes of absolute legalism and
total situationism. Fletcher admits no such middle ground.
Because of his own “contextualism” Hugh Barbour also chided
Vail Palmer for holding a “mixed ethic.” Quite the contrary,
I feel that a “mixed,” “balanced,” “both-and” ethic is not some
thing to be accused of or criticized for
— it is a strength to be
rejoiced in!
If I am a legalist in ethics, I would like to be known as a
“soft legalist,” or preferably as a “flexible legalist” or a “con
textual or situational legalist.” I rejoice in the ten command
nients of the Mosaic tradition and use Jesus’ Sermon on the
Mount and the Advices and Queries of the Quaker tradition )
as canons of conduct. But as I do so I wait for the guidance
or voice of the Holy Spirit teaching me how to apply them in
each new emergency ethical decision. Thus used the Decalogue
and the Sermon on the Mount are not ossified absolutes but
become living norms. Besides, by experience we learn some
thing from each ethical decision. When a new ethical crisis
arises we recognize the similarity to a past emergency of the
same sort and to that degree we are better informed on how to
act this time. Further, the combined ethical experience of the
community of faith builds into a sort of living thesaurus of
ethical tradition which does not dissipate with my death or
with the end of my private experience. This living tradition
illuminated to succeeding generations is found par excellence
in the Scriptures and also for us in the early Quaker tradition.
Our spiritual forbears laid down their lives rather than commit
idolatry, adultery or murder. People just don’t lay down their
lives for frozen, heteronomous legal precepts, nor for static,
abstract absolutes. You can only put your life on the line for
personalized norms of conduct made vibrant and alive for you
by the power of the Holy Spirit in your own ethical experience.
The incorporation of such vital ethical tradition is essen
tial to any ethics in my view. From this standpoint situation
ethics is only half there, because it lacks such a tradition. Con
textual ethics fares better than situational only if it brings
such living ethical norms into its context.
I want to enter a plea for a return to “the living Torah.”
If you read the 19th Psalm verses 7-10 or the whole of the 119th
Psalm you will find songs of praise and exultation in Torah
¶
24 L 25
piled one upon the other. The former reads: “The Torah of
the Lord is perfect, reviving the soul; the testimony of the Lord
is sure, making wise the simple; the precepts of the Lord are
right, rejoicing the heart; the commandment of the Lord is
pure, enlightening the eyes; the fear of the Lord is clean,
enduring forever; the ordinances of the Lord are true, and
righteous altogether. More to be desired are they than gold,
even much fine gold; sweeter also than honey and the drippings
of the hone)comb.” Psalm 40:8 also says it: “I delight to do
thy will, 0 my God; thy Torah is within my heart.” Delight in
Torah, this is the heart of fudaism! George Fox stoutly main
tained, “I am a Jew, a Jew inward.” I have to say “amen” to
dear George. I’m a Jew too, a spiritual Jew. My delight is in
the law of Moses as interpreted, interiorized and fulfilled by
Jesus and Paul. That means that I love Yahweh’s “statutes,
commandments and ordinances.” Similarly, my heart says,
“Lay it on, Lord,” whenever Jesus says, “You have heard it
said by men of old time . . . but I say unto you,” or “What is
that to thee9 Follow thou me!” I want to do those things
commanded by Torah and interpreted by Jesus in a living,
sensitive, responsive way with every fibre of my being! With
this inner ethical attitude I experience a living ethical nexus
in which the Spirit guides through each emergency decision.
Vail Palmer also emphasizes the importance of the concept
of covenant to the normative or content side of ethics. Cove
nant is a love relationship between God and people in which
Yahweh lavishes his love upon his people, Israel, and thence
upon all mankind. Essentially covenant means his promise to
love, dwell with and be faithful to people forever. Torah and
the ten commandments are by-laws of this love relationship.
Ethics, morality and codes of conduct are born of our loving
gratitude for such unmerited divine largesse.
What I covet for Friends and for all men is the recovery
of and commitment to the concept of living Torah expressed
in covenant ethics with all the flexibility and responsiveness of
situationism built into it. If this be legalism, I happily plead,
“Guilty!”
‘
PAUL E. PFUETZE
Vail Palmer’s fine paper raises as many questions for me
as it answers. His ending is ambivalent and inconclusive, as
perhaps it should be. He seems to end up (as most of us do,
I suspect) with a “mixed ethic,” or “act-agapism” and “rule
agapism” in tension. He wants freedom and order, spontaneity
within a disciplined structure. He wants timely as well as
timeless elements of Christian-Quaker thought, continuity of
basic biblical norms with changes to meet specific situations,
constancy but constantly varied, for he recognizes that “new
occasions teach new duties.” I won’t quarrel with that.
Vail Palmer says that the great ethical insight of the early
Friends was their interpretation of certain ethical practices as
direct testimonies to their faith in Christ. He does not say
direct testimonies froni Christ! Do these prepositions not point
to an important difference? Must we today honor Christ in
precisely the same particular ways? Cannot life in the Spirit
be constant, yet constantly open in response to new conditions?
If not, then Quakerly manners like hat-honor, plain talk, and
plain clothes become in our day merely eccentric, like those
other Plain People who wear beards but don’t wear buttons.
The author insists that the early Quakers acted from
absolute moral rules. He admits, however, that Fox and Penn
and Naylor made exceptions. But it takes only one exception
to break a rule. There are mitigating circumstances in many
complex situations. In crucial moral situations there is rarely
a clear good against a clear evil. Indeed, do we ever possess
full, sensitive knowledge of the complex situations in which the
moral decision is made? And in his last paragraph, Vail Palmer
gently chides the Quakers for a too rigid and unloving adher
ence to their excessively legalistic discipline. Too often the new
life in the Spirit becomes ossified into a new set of rules. Is this
not why an early Advice from a General Meeting of Friends
at Balby, in 1656, declared: “Dearly beloved Friends, these
things we do not lay upon you as a rule or form to walk by,
but that all, with the measure of light which is pure and holy,
may be guided; and so in the light walking and abiding, these
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may be fulfilled in the Spirit, not from the letter, for the letter
killeth, but the Spirit giveth life.”
‘ro balance the picture, Vail Palmer also warns against a
too lax situational approach. I agree. But with reference to
what he calls the mandates of early Quaker tradition, what of
our present day conservative legalistic Friends who betray the
peace testimony, the testimony against respect of persons (I
know many racists in the Society of Friends), and who arc
uncritical beneficiaries of an exploitative economic system and
a system of built-in institutional covert violence? Is this not
contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Declaration of 1660?
Obviously there are legalists and traditionalists who bend the
law to suit their purposes or their situation, just as there are
contextualists who bend the law in ways which appear shocking
to the legalist. (What, by the way, is it about Fletcher’s situ
ationism and utilitarianism which makes it seem so radical?)
And remember that there were many devout Quakers operating
on the Underground Railway who would lie or bend the truth
without a qualm rather than turn an escaped slave over to his
pursuing master.
Vail Palmer begins from the position that the thought and
practice of early Quakers is “somehow normative.” Somehow!
He declares that we cannot go back to a literal repetition of
17th century Quakerism. Then what? Did the early Friends
give us a set of absolute moral propositions and eternally
correct forms of behavior, or primarily a method of seeking
God’s Light and Will in a company of seekers? I am inclined
to think the latter.
Aren’t we really dealing with a method of making ethical
decisions, rather than a specific content? “Situation ethics”
also refers to a method; but the method itself does not dictate
the final decision. Other factors, values, experiences, principles,
dispositions, and attitudes will also be at work. Conscience, we
know, is not a clear “Voice of God” but a coming into focus of
a whole accumulation of learnings, insights, value judgments,
and principles which become normative at the point of decision.
Therefore, I think the author is correct in saying that a
radical critique and prophetic judgment of personal morality
and of unjust social orders must come from outside the exist
ing situation. But isn’t it precisely something within the situ
ation which provides the occasion, motive, and spur for radical
revision or innovation? The prophets never operated in a
social vacuum. Again, a “mixed” picture: one without the
other will hardly do. An open canon with a continuing revela
tion of the “mighty acts of God” comes to men only in the
dramas of history, in the concrete existential meeting of men
with God in the particular events of history.
Vail Palmer merely mentions Emil Brunner in passing.
It might hae been fruitful to examine further the views of
Brunner, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Martin Buber with their
ethic of responsibility, of response to what God is doing in the
concrete events of history. In these thinkers we may have a
resolution of the )Olarity between deeds and rules. It seems to
me that Niebuhr and Buber are able to include, embrace, and
at the same time reconcile what is valid in both de-ontological
and teleological mDthods. They go beyond both to a genuine
synthesis, to a truly biblical ethic of universal norms, sensitive
responsibility, and grace. Here there may not be an unambig
uous universal absolute but there is an existential absolute for
the actor. Here one walks the “narrow ridge” with fear and
trembling.
I don’t follow the distinction between God as primarily
Redeemer and God as Creator. I am uncomfortable about this
as an interpretation of either Christian or Quaker thought. It
seems to me rather that in Christian theology creation and
redemption must always be held together in tension. To me
one without the other has little meaning and the whole drama
of salvation makes little sense.
Vail Palmer is correct irs faulting Fletcher for over-simpli
fication in his typology and in his ethical reasoning. But the
legalist also over-simplifies in his effort to formulate a sum
mary rule which will cover all possible cases. Thus it was that
the rabbis and Talmudists piled up 613 mitzvoth. Even within
the Ten Commandments one is often compelled to break one
of the commandments if he obeys another. This is surely one
reason why Jesus reduced the Law and the Prophets to two
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commandments — the love of God and love of the neighbor —
and finally these are further reduced to one: the Law of Love.
For all of the thinkers considered, Love is the Law of
Life; but how love is interpreted makes a lot of moral differ
ence. Yet nowhere do our authors give us clear definitions of
the key terms, such as “love” and “freedom” and “human.”
What does it mean to he free in the Spirit in terms of conduct?
What does it mean to love the neighbor in the many complex
situations within the common life? What is the loving way to
deal with the Viet Cong, the Black Panthers, hard-core crimi
nals, student rioters, striking workers, the homosexual? (My
own practical working definition is: I love my neighbor when
his welfame, security, satisfaction, and freedom are equally
important with my own.)
Life is lived in particulars, not in broad generalities. So
it saves wear and tear to have habits, precepts, guidelines, and
rules to provide specific guidance. And in perhaps 99% of the
cases, the habits and rules serve us well. But there is that
100th instance when the rule breaks down or the habit serves
us badly. If th situation is so crucial in determining what
love and responsibility require, it is most important how one
understands the situation. The situation will never be the
same for any two actors.
Life in the Spirit does indeed rule out certain things.
One who loves God does not please to do just anything! To
be in the Spirit should not lead to a simple antinomianism or
hedonism, as the early church fathers recognized in declaring
antinomianism a heresy. (But Fletcher is no more an anti
nomian or radical relativist than he is a legalist.) The love
of the neighbor is but the other and positive side of the same
coin of self-denial. The “human” life does need freedom but
always within an order of discipline and structured relation
ships, just as a baby needs both freedom and security.
And forgiveness does not cancel out moral criticism or
even just punishment. If human beings or human society need
elements of restraint, then love will accept that necessity, but
it will keep alive the compassionate and reconciling spirit in
the midst of these necessities. It will remember that there is
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nothing evil in my neighbor that is not also potentially, if
not actually, present in myself. No one is without sin and guilt
and bad judgment, not even Quakers who think they live daily
in the Spirit. Any forgiveness we extend to another is always
the forgiveness of a forgiven sinner. Any restraint which we
exercise over others is that of one who himself is under
restraint.I
I
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